We consider a double moral hazard model with three agents: the entrepreneur, the LBO fund and the bank. The entrepreneur and the LBO fund have to exert e¤orts in order to improve the productivity of their project; e¤orts are not observable. We show that the bank's payments decrease with the outcome of the project. When the project is not very risky, the entrepreneur and the LBO fund exert …rst best e¤orts and they get equal shares of the project's outcome. When it is highly risky, debt gives high powered incentives to the two agents to provide e¤orts but it still not su¢ cient to induce them to provide the …rst best e¤orts. However, these e¤orts are more e¢ cient than those that could be provided if the entrepreneur asks the LBO fund for advice and money. Moreover, when the entrepreneur asks for advice from a consultant and for money from a bank, they get equal shares whether the project is very risky or not. When the project is lowly risky, the identity of the advisor (consultant/ LBO fund) is irrelevant. When it is highly risky, the optimal …nancial structure of capital depends on the impact of their e¤orts on the performance of the project.
Introduction
Leveraged Buy Out acquisition commonly known as LBO 1 accounts for a signi…cant part of the corporate …nance and plays a major role in structuring mergers, acquisitions and transmissions.
There are three main facts about LBO …nance:
First, the LBO fund (hereafter he) is an active investor and he is well connected with many industries: he is engaged in the day to day operations of the …rm, he helps to recruit key personnel, he negotiates with suppliers, bank (hereafter he) and other …nancial partners and he advises the entrepreneur (hereafter she) on all the strategic decisions.
Second, the level of debt is signi…cantly high. Moreover, there are many kinds of debt, such as the mezzanine debt, the subordinate debt and the convertible debt, each debt has a speci…c level of risk.
Finally, the use of convertible securities becomes prevalent in LBO …nance. It is surprising because these securities are very rarely issued by banks or passive outside equity holders who …nance more established and less risky companies.
This paper provides a theory of LBO …nancing based on a contractual approach. The theoretical model that we present deals with the two …rst facts. The model describes the relationship between the LBO fund and the entrepreneur engaged in the acquisition of a …rm.
The success of these acquisitions is explained not only by the use of debt but it depends also on the market conditions, the performance of the Op Co and the partners'abilities. The entrepreneur is endowed with technical skills and he knows well the acquired compagny while the LBO fund plays a dual role: he is a …nancier and an adviser at the same time.
The question raised in this paper is the following: why does the entrepreneur prefer asking for …nancing and for advice from the LBO fund and the bank, while the LBO fund alone is able to advise her and to …nance the project?
The LBO fund is usually not wealth-constrained, like the majority of private equity funds: these funds participate in the formation of large companies and they issue high level of equity. In Venture capital 2 , the venture capitalist fund (hereafter VC fund) is usually the only …nancier in the project and he is also providing advice.
To answer the question, we consider three agents: the entrepreneur, the LBO fund 3 and the bank. The entrepreneur is the manager of the Op Co and she wants to acquire it. The entrepreneur is wealth-constrained this is why she asks …rst for advice and for money from the LBO fund. These two partners sign a …rst contract: the holding contract and they establish the holding company (hereafter the holding). They can also ask for additional funding from the bank and then they sign a second contract: the debt contract. The entrepreneur and the LBO fund have to exert non observable e¤orts which induce a double-sided moral hazard problem.
The optimal …nancial contracts have to meet three objectives: (1) each agent gets at least the cost of his initial investment (2) to determine the payments of each agent when the project succeeds and when it fails and (3) to incite the entrepreneur and the LBO fund to exert e¢ cient e¤orts.
We study the impacts of …nancial capital structure on the e¤orts when there is a double-sided moral hazard problem. To our knowledge, there is no such study applied on LBO. However, a number of papers study this question on the venture capital.
The private equity investors distinguish clearly the LBO project from the venture capital project but the academics usually confuse the two projects.
In venture capital, the start-up projects cannot be …nanced with debt: it's too risky for banks. Hence, the entrepreneur and the VC fund have no other choice: they must issue equity to invest in the project (Sahlman 1988 (Sahlman , 1990 . In contrast to Sahlman, Chan, Siegel and Thakor (1990) consider that the LBO acquisitions is a particular case of the venture capital projects:
"Venture Capitalists may be broadly categorized into two groups. One group consists of venture capitalists who specialize in providing "seed money" for start-up projects 4 , and the other group consists of those who provide funds to relatively established …rms, including those involved in leveraged buyouts."
To avoid such confusion, we will throw light on similarities and di¤erences between the two projects.
The LBO acquisitions and start-ups have many similarities in the sense:
The VC fund and the LBO fund are active investors; they play a double role of a …nancier and an adviser. They assist the entrepreneur in running the company and participate in all tasks. When the project does not meet his short term objectives, the entrepreneur is dismissed and they get the control of the project.
The two funds issue equity and in exchange they get a part of the company's control.
They look for a high rate of return and a quick exit. Once the project is …nished, they sell their shares to the entrepreneur or the company is going public (via IPO).
There are still some di¤erences between the two projects:
The level of risk: the start-up is signi…cantly riskier than the LBO project. The former is a very innovative company, the product is innovative in the market while the latter concerns more established companies. The LBO project consists of a subsidiary of a listed company or a large group, which is acquired by its manager and/or its sta¤. Financiers are expecting for a large amount of cash- ‡ows which could be paid to the holding company. These cash- ‡ows will be used to pay the bank.
This point is the consequence of the previous one: LBO project is largely …nanced by the bank's credit. It represents more than 70% in the capital structure (Jensen, 1991) . In contrast to LBO, the start-up can issue only equity: due to short guarantee, the banks usually refuse to …nance the innovative projects, particularly when the entrepreneur lacks the skills to build up a rapidly growing company or to e¢ ciently organize production, controlling, and marketing.
When the company is going private via LBO, it is going public to private. Sometimes, it may be sold to new managers and/or industrials or acquired via a second LBO. In contrast to the LBO, the best start-ups, the high ‡yers, that are going to be very pro…table are listed and they are going public. This is why the venture capital is considered as the private to public.
Several papers focus on the relationship between capital structure of the start-ups and the incentives to e¤orts in the presence of a double-sided moral hazard problem. Bergemann and Hege (1998) present a dynamic agency model with learning and moral hazard problems. They show that short-term re…nancing 5 is never optimal but long-term contract allowing for intertemporal risksharing such as the stage …nancing 6 is optimal. This …nancial regime constrains the entrepreneur to provide optimal e¤ort so that she could obtain funding for his project. If not, the VC fund will not invest additional capital and will abandon the project. This may be interpreted as a bad signal concerning the quality in the market. Cornelli and Yosha (2003) show that the stage …nancing may induce a window dressing problem: the entrepreneur is tempted to announce a good short-term performance. Her aim is to reduce the probability that the project will be abandoned or liquidated. They conclude that the use of the convertible debt solves the "window dressing" problem: when the project looks too pro…table, the VC fund will convert his debt into equity which reduces the entrepreneur's pro…t. Schmidt (1999 Schmidt ( , 2003 does not study the stage …nancing regime but he focuses on the incentive properties of the convertible securities. He proposes a model where the pro…t that can be generated by the entrepreneur and the VC fund depends on three factors: the quality of the project and/or the abilities of the entrepreneur (the state of the world), their e¤orts, and further …nancial investment of the VC fund. The state of the world has an impact on the results of the project. It is unknown to both parties at date 0 and can be observed only after the initial investment has been sunk. Schmidt shows that there is no debt-equity contract that induces both parties to invest e¢ ciently.
He joins Cornelli and Yosha and he deduces that convertible securities constraint both agents to exert optimal e¤orts. When he considers a multi-dimensional investments 7 , the convertible debt contract still implements the …rst best investments of both parties.
My model is closely related to those of Casamatta (2003) and Repullo and Suarez (2004) . They present a double-sided moral hazard model with a pure …nancier.
Casamatta considers a model with three agents: an entrepreneur endowed with an innovative idea, an adviser and a pure …nancier. When the adviser invests money in the project he is a VC fund, and a consultant when he only exerts e¤ort. The entrepreneur and the advisor have to exert substitute e¤orts. When these e¤orts are observable, whether the advisor is a consultant or a VC fund is irrelevant. There are many ways to implement the …rst best. This is no longer true when e¤orts are non observable. The consultant e¤ort is less e¢ cient than her proper e¤ort. Thus, she prefers asking for the VC fund's advice.
In order to solve the double moral hazard problem, all agents must participate …nancially in the project. When the project is not very risky, the presence of the pure …nancier induces both agents to exert …rst best e¤orts. On the contrary, when it is very risky, they need high powered incentive to exert e¢ cient e¤orts. Casamatta proposes to pledge the revenue to the pure …nancier when the project fails and to let the entrepreneur and the VC fund share the revenue in case of success: it is a "live or die" contract (Iness, 1990) . This is still not su¢ cient to constrain them to exert optimal e¤orts: the moral hazard problem induce them to exert second best e¤orts.
Repullo and Suarez consider a stage …nancing model. The entrepreneur is wealth-constrained and she asks for advice and for money from two VC funds. One of them does not provide e¤ort so he may be considered as a pure or passive …nancier. The entrepreneur and the other fund have to exert non observable e¤orts. They conclude that the entrepreneur must ask for advice and fund from the partner who provides both money and advice. The project gives no gains when it fails and ' otherwise, where ' is a continuous random variable. ' is non observable when they sign the contract, they will learn more about it at the end of the …rst period. When the project is pro…table, it is continued, otherwise it is abandoned. When it is continued, the VC fund must invest additional capital.
If ' is veri…able, the entrepreneur and the VC fund sign an initial long-term contract contingent on ' (The contingent …nancing contract). They show that the VC fund must get a constant share of the outcome only when the project is pro…table. However, if ' is not veri…able, they sign a start-up contract which is negotiated in the expansion stage, the venture fund gets a positive share of the revenue in the case of success only when this revenue is signi…cantly important otherwise he has nothing.
We consider a single-period model and that the entire cost of the project is invested when the contracts are signed. In contrast to Casamatta, we suppose that the entrepreneur is the only wealth-constrained agent and that the e¤orts are complementary. There is a continuum of LBO funds and banks. Once the contracts are signed, the partners cannot abandon the project.
We determine endogenously the …nancial contribution of each agent and its share of the project return. We focus particularly on the presence of the bank and its impact on the incentives to e¤ort. We show that the LBO fund must issue a signi…cant part of equity. The payment of the bank decreases with the outcome of the project. We join Casamatta (2003) , Jensen (1986 Jensen ( , 1989 , Jensen and Meckling (1976) ... We show that the LBO debt induces the agents to exert e¢ cient e¤orts and it reduces agency costs. Furthermore, the way the project's outcome is shared between the agents, the bank's payments and the provided e¤orts depend on the quality of project but not on the …nancial capital structure:
When the project is not very risky, we generalize the Casamatta's model and we show that both agents exert the …rst best e¤orts. She concludes that the di¤erence between the gains of success and failure of each agent must be equal to the di¤erence between the revenues of the project. Unlike Casamatta, we are able to compare the gains of the entrepreneur and the LBO fund when the project succeeds and when it fails. We …nd that they must get equal shares of the outcome of the project When the project is very risky, the entrepreneur and the LBO fund provide second best e¤orts. Double moral hazard problem induces them to make less e¢ cient investment decisions. They share the revenue in case of success and pledge the entire revenue to the bank when the project fails. Casamatta shows that the entrepreneur must get the highest part of the revenue. We conclude that the sharing rule depends on the impact of each e¤ort on the performance of the project.
In addition, the entrepreneur and the LBO fund make less e¢ cient e¤orts when the bank does not participate in the project. Moreover, when the LBO fund participates in the project without issuing equity, they get equal gains whether the project is very risky or not. If the project is lowly risky, whether the adviser is the consultant or the LBO fund is irrelevant, the entrepreneur and her advisor provide the …rst best e¤orts. When it is highly risky, the optimal …nancial structure depends on the impact of each e¤ort on the performance of the project.
The model and the assumptions are presented in section 1. Section 2 solves the model and derives the properties of the …nancial optimal contracts. Section 3 focuses on the properties of …nancial contracts when the entrepreneur and the LBO fund participate in the project without the bank and when the LBO fund does not contribute …nancially to the project. We compare these contracts with those derived from the previous section. The last section concludes the paper. All proofs are presented in Appendix.
The model
We consider an entrepreneur E who wants to acquire a company where she is the manager. The cost of project is equal to K. She invests W but she is wealth-constrained. So she asks …rst for advice and money from the LBO fund A. She concedes a part of the company's control 1 (0 1) and he issues equity i. These two partners may ask for additional …nancing from the bank B. The latter may lend them an amount I = K (W + i) which corresponds to a debt D.
The project is risky and generates an observable random revenue . It depends on the quality of the project, the entrepreneur skills, the market conditions... It can take two values:
u when the project succeeds and d when it fails where u > d . When the project fails, d is equal to its liquidation value. The probability of success is denoted p(e; a), where e and a 2 R + are the e¤orts provided respectively by the entrepreneur and the LBO funds. The entrepreneur's e¤ort is related to technical skills. The LBO fund may exert a technical e¤ort or a managerial e¤ort such as the monitoring. We assume that the probability function p(e; a) is increasing and concave. We add the condition @ 2 p(e;a) @e@a > 0 so that we ensure that e¤orts are complementary. Furthermore, p(e; 0) = p(0; a) = 0: it means that both agents must exert strictly positive e¤orts so that the probability of success would be strictly positive. Making e¤orts (e; a) = (0; 0) is a Nash equilibrium but it means that the project fails with probability one.
The sequence of events in the model
At the date 0, E and A negotiate and sign a …rst contract: the holding contract. The holding and the bank B sign a second contract: the debt contract. There is a continuum of LBO fund and banks. When contracts are signed, agents cannot abandon the project before the exit date.
At the date 1, E and A have to exert non contractible e¤orts, respectively e and a. Let u(e) and v(a) denote the respective cost functions. These functions are increasing, convex and satisfy
The date 2 is the exit date and at that date, the project is …nished. If it succeeds, the bank gets the payment D and the two agents share the residual amount; they get respectively ( All agents are risk neutral and the risk-free rate is normalized to 0. The sequence of events is summarized in the following …gure:
Figure 1 -The sequence of events in the model.
Financial contracts
Two …nancial contracts must be speci…ed in this model:
1. The holding contract: it determines the amount of equity that must be issued by the LBO fund and his share of bene…ts. He participates in the project if his revenue is positive. This constraint is written:
where (P C A ) is the participation constraint of the LBO funds. The agent E asks for money and for advice from many LBO funds. He deals with the one who makes the best o¤er (i; ). This o¤er gives him a zero payo¤; (P C A ) is satis…ed when EU A = 0.
2. The debt contract: the bank lends I at the date 0. At the date 3, he is paid D when the project's result is success, otherwise he gets H. The bank is willing to lend only if he will recoup what he would get if he makes a risk-free investment. It means that:
where (P C B ) is the participation constraint of the bank, it is satis…ed when EU B = 0.
The model without double moral hazard
The social value of the project V (e; a) is given by:
The …rst best e¤orts e F B and a F B are deduced from the …rst order conditions of V (e; a).They are given respectively by:
@V (e, a) @e
@V (e, a) @a
The equations (1) and (2) can be written:
The ratios of the marginal cost to the marginal probability of e¤orts are equal to the di¤erence between the revenue in case of success and the revenue in case of failure. The probability of success when the agents provide …rst best e¤ort is denoted p F B = p(e F B , a F B ). Then, the optimal social value of the project is given by:
is assumed to be strictly positive.
The …rst best solution can be implemented in a number of ways: the entrepreneur and the LBO fund may ask money from the bank or the LBO fund may invest i = K W . Without transaction costs, there are many ways to implement the …rst best: the entrepreneur can ask for advice and for money from the LBO fund (they sign one contract: the holding contract) or she can rely on the LBO fund and the bank (they sign two contracts: the holding and the debt contracts). She may asks also for advice from a consultant and for money from the bank. In this case, the entrepreneur is indi¤erent towards the identities of the agents providing money and advice.
2. The optimal …nancial contracts with double moral hazard
Properties of the e¤orts
We suppose now that e¤orts are non observable. The entrepreneur (respectively the LBO fund) exerts the level of e¤ort e (respectively a) that maximizes her (respectively his) expected pro…t given its cost and the contracts established: hence, each e¤ort is increasing with the other one.
The reaction functions of E and A are given by their incentive constraints. They are respectively written:
These functions e(a) and a(e) are respectively the solutions of the following equations:
(1 )(
By di¤erentiating the equations (4) and (5), we obtain: e 0 (a) = u 0 (e)p ea (e; a) u 00 (e)p e (e; a) u 0 (e)p ee (e; a) 0
The e¤ort of the entrepreneur (respectively the LBO fund) is an increasing function of the e¤ort of the LBO fund (respectively of the entrepreneur): the e¤orts are strategic complements.
The optimal …nancial contracts
Competition among the LBO funds and the banks induces A and B to propose respectively holding and debt contracts that maximize the expected pro…t of the entrepreneur given by ( ; i ; I ; D ; H ) 2 arg max
with the additional conditions:
The participation constraints (P C A ) and (P C B ) are binding, so the amounts of equity and debt issued respectively by the LBO fund and the bank are given by:
We replace (7) and (8) in the objective function. The optimal …nancial contracts induce the entrepreneur to maximize the social value of the project under the incentive constraints (IC E ) and (IC A ). Hence the entrepreneur's program is
(4), (5) with the conditions (6).
The social value of the project is optimal if the agents exert …rst best e¤orts, in other words, the e¤orts e F B and a F B must satisfy the incentive constraints (4) and (5).
Given the equation (3), we replace in (4) and (5). We obtain:
It means that the bene…t share of the entrepreneur is equal to = 1 2 . The revenues of the project are …xed, if the optimal contract gives powerful incentives to one agent, it will reduce the incentives of the other agent. The optimal …nancial contracts must boost the two agents'incentives to provide …rst best e¤orts; they must get equal pro…t shares. We notice that this sharing rule depends neither on the capital structure, nor on the e¤orts'e¢ ciency.
When we substitute = 1 2 in (9), we get:
u , but D 0, in other words, the project must be not very risky in the sense u 2 d . We conclude that the bank payments are decreasing with the outcome of the project: the collateral is larger than his payment when the project succeeds.
The bank payments are summarized in the …gure (2): The following proposition presents the properties of the optimal …nancial contracts:
Proposition 1 When the project is not very risky l, 2l ] , the optimal …nancial contracts are given by:
The proof of this proposition is presented in the Appendix A.
When the project is not very risky, the LBO fund issues a high amount of equity. Moreover the LBO fund and the entrepreneur exert …rst best e¤orts and they get equal shares of the bene…t. Although i is larger than W , their payments are equal. They get u + W K v(a F B ), if the project succeeds and
when it fails. The di¤erence between these payments is equal to the di¤erence between the revenues of the project
The intuition of the proposition (1) is the following. In order to induce the agents to provide optimal e¤orts, the bank payments must be decreasing with the outcome of the project. Indeed, despite the fact that is not very large, they are constrained to provide …rst best e¤orts in order to perceive the highest payments; the success payments.
We conclude that when the project is not very risky in the sense de…ned in proposition (1), the presence of the bank constrains the agents to exert optimal e¤orts. In addition, the entrepreneur captures the whole social value of the project while the LBO fund and the bank recoup the costs of their investments.
When the project is very risky ( u > 2 d ), the collateral H is equal to the liquidation value of the project d .
The entrepreneur and the LBO fund exert e¤orts that maximize their expected gains. These gains are given by:
The reaction functions are given by the …rst order conditions of EU E and EU A :
(1 )p a (e; a)(
Given (10) and (11), we deduce that the optimal sharing rule must satisfy the following condition:
As before, we substitute i and W in the objective function, the optimal …nancial contracts maximize the social value of the project under the incentive constraints (10) and (11). Hence, the program to be solved is the following:
V (e; a) = p(e; a)
(10) and (11) with the conditions:
The general model does not enable us to study the properties of these contracts when the project is highly risky, this is why we rely on the following speci…cation of the general model. We consider that:
p(e; a) = e 1 a where 2 ]0; 1[ measures the impact of the e¤ort of the LBO fund on the success'probability. In other words, it is the LBO e¤ort elasticity of the success probability. The functions of cost are given by: 
. These e¤orts are increasing with the di¤erence between the revenues of the project. When the project is very risky, the …rst best e¤orts are larger than those that they might make when the project is not very risky. Furthermore, when the impact of the e¤ort of the LBO fund on the success probability is high such that + , his …rst best e¤ort is larger than the e¤ort provided by the entrepreneur. Otherwise, the entrepreneur provides the highest e¤ort.
We denote by p F B = 2 ( ) (1 ) the probability of success of the project when agents provide the …rst best e¤orts. To ensure that this probability is inferior to 1, we assume that:
The optimal social value of the project is given by: 
We replace e and a respectively by e(a) and a(e), we obtain the following optimal e¤orts:
where
] . e and a are increasing with the success revenue and they are decreasing with the success payment of the bank D. When the revenue of success is high, the incentives to e¤orts are important. Indeed, the entrepreneur and the LBO fund are tempted to get the attractive payments: the success payments. Their expected payments are given by:
These gains increase with u and decrease with D. Given the competition among the LBO funds,
The project succeeds with a probability p = ( )( u D). We assume that:
to ensure that the success probability is always inferior to 1.
If the …nancial contracts attribute all the gain to entrepreneur or to the LBO fund, the project will fail with probability one ( (0) = (1) = 0). This enables us to conclude that: 0 < < 1.
The following proposition summarizes the properties of the optimal …nancial contracts:
Proposition 2 When the project is very risky u > 2 d , the optimal …nancial contracts are given by:D = 0
The proof of this proposition is presented in the Appendix B.
This proposition shows that the optimal sharing rule^ is a function of . When > 1 2 , the LBO fund's share of bene…t is larger than the entrepreneur's share. Despite the fact that the LBO fund's e¤ort is more costly than the entrepreneur e¤ort, it has the most important impact on the probability of success. It is more e¢ cient to give him powered incentives to provide e¤ort; like for example attributing him the highest share of the project's outcome. When the impact of LBO fund's e¤ort on the probability success is low, it is e¢ cient to give powered incentives to the agent who provides the less costly e¤ort.
When the project is highly risky, the agents make the e¤orts given by:
We substitute (^ ) in (15), we deduce that:
These e¤orts depend on .
We focus on the particular case where = 
The double moral hazard induces the agents to make less e¢ cient e¤orts: the levels of …rst best e¤orts are high. We need powerful incentive mechanisms to constrain the entrepreneur and the LBO to exert the optimal e¤orts. The revenue should be shared between them in the case of success, and the entire revenue should be attributed to the bank when the project fails. However it is still not su¢ cient to induce them to spend the …rst best e¤orts.
The LBO fund issued a signi…cantly high amount of equity i = i . The entrepreneur cannot get the whole optimal social value, her expected gain is given by:
3. Financial capital structure: debt or equity?
The question raised in this section is the following: Is it the debt or the fact of relying on a …nancial partner who o¤ ers …nancing and advising that induces the two partners to provide e¢ cient e¤ orts?
To answer our question, we consider two cases: in the …rst case, the project is implemented without debt: the LBO issues all the remaining capital. In the second case, we suppose that the entrepreneur asks for advice from the consultant and for a debt K W from the bank.
Optimal …nancial contracts without debt
In this paragraph, the LBO fund is assumed to be not wealthy-constrained. We suppose that the project is implemented without debt; the LBO fund issue equity i = K W .
The agents provide the levels of e¤orts that enable them to maximize their expected gains which are given by:
Their reaction functions are given by the …rst order conditions of EU E and EU A . They are written:
(1 )p a (e; a) v 0 (a) = 0
We deduce that the optimal sharing rule must satisfy (12).
Without debt, the LBO fund has to issue the totality of the remaining capital, i.e. i = K W . As in the previous section, the optimal holding contract induces the entrepreneur to maximize the social value of the project under the incentive constraints (20) and (21). This program is given by M ax , e, a EU E = p(e; a)
(20) and (21)
with the additional condition:
We substitute p(e; a), u(e) and v(a) in the objective function respectively with their expressions e 1 a , e 2 2 and a 2 2 . We deduce that the optimal e¤orts e c and a c are functions of and . They are written:
Given that 0 < < 1, we show that the entrepreneur and the LBO exert second best e¤orts:
Proposition 3 Under the condition i c = K W , the entrepreneur share of bene…t is given by:
The proof of proposition (3) is presented in the Appendix C.
This proposition states that when the impact of the LBO fund's e¤ort on the success probability is low, such that 2]0; The sign of (a c â) Figure 3 shows that the e¤orts given by (16) are more e¢ cient than those given by (24).
When = 1 2 , as seen before, the e¤orts have the same impact on the success probability, if we …x high share of bene…t to one agent, we will induce him to provide an important e¤ort but, at the same time, we will reduce the incentives of the other agent. This is why it is optimal to give them equal shares of bene…t so that they are both induced to provide more e¢ cient e¤orts. Thus, they provide the e¤orts given by: 
We notice that these e¤orts are less e¢ cient than those given by (17), when the bank does not participate in the project. This means that the entrepreneur prefers asking for advice and for money from the LBO fund and the bank rather than relying only on the LBO fund.
The expected gain of the entrepreneur is lower than the optimal social value of the project such that:
For high level of ( 7 ! 1), her gain comes close to V F B .
Optimal …nancial contracts when the LBO fund does not issue equity: the case of a consultant
We suppose now that the LBO fund does not contribute …nancially into the project but he still spend the e¤ort a. The LBO fund can be considered as a simple consultant. The two partners will ask for the remaining amount K W from the bank.
The participation constraints of the consultant and the bank (P C A ) and (P C B ) are given by:
The two constraints are satis…ed because of the competition among the consultants and the banks.
The optimal e¤orts are given by the …rst order conditions of (27) and (28). So, they must satisfy the conditions (4) and (5).
As in the previous sections, the entrepreneur maximizes her expected gain under the participation constraints of the bank and the consultant and the incentive constraints. Hence, the program to be solved is written: 27) and (28) with the conditions (6).
We substitute W , according to the participation constraint (28), by:
in the objective function so that we get: (5) and (27) with the conditions (6).
The proposition (4) summarizes the properties of the optimal …nancial contracts.
Proposition 4 When the bank invests the remaining capital I = K W , the entrepreneur and the consultant get equal shares of the bene…t:~ = 1 2 . Then, the optimal debt contract is given by:
When the project is lowly risky
When the project is highly risky
The proof of the proposition (4) is presented in the Appendix D.
This proposition shows that these contracts have the same properties of the contracts discussed in propositions (1) and (2): giving the bank decreasing payments induces the entrepreneur and the consultant to exert the …rst best e¤orts when u is not very large compared with d . However, this is no longer true when the di¤erence between the project's revenues is very large, to induce them to exert e¢ cient e¤orts, we must give them high-powered incentives as sharing the revenue of success between them and pledging the entire revenue of failure to the bank. These contracts exhibit the features of a "live or die" contract. Despite these incentives, the level of …rst best e¤orts are still high, the entrepreneur and the consultant exert second best e¤orts, given by:
In contrast with the proposition (2), whatever the impact of each e¤ort on the success'probability and the quality of the project are, the entrepreneur and the consultant have equal remunerations. We notice that when = 1 2 , the e¤orts (31) are equal to those given by (16) and the project succeeds with a probabilityp = 1 2
We conclude that when the project is not very risky, the identity of the agent providing advice; the LBO fund or the consultant, is irrelevant for the entrepreneur. Hence, the partners spend e¢ cient e¤orts because the debt is a high powered incentive constraint. The advising and the …nancing of the LBO fund alone is not su¢ cient to induce them to provide the …rst best e¤orts.
When > 1 2 , we show that the e¤ort exerted by the entrepreneur in the presence of the consultant and the bank, given by (31), is more e¢ cient than her e¤ort when she implements the project with the LBO fund and the bank (16). In the opposite, the …nancial investor is better o¤ when he contributes …nancially into the project, as the LBO fund. The intuition of this result is the following: when the e¤ort of the LBO fund has a signi…cant impact on the probability of success, his share of the bene…ts is higher than the entrepreneur's share. Hence, the entrepreneur prefers a consultant because they will perceive equal payments.
When the entrepreneur's e¤ort is more e¢ cient than the LBO's e¤orts, her share of bene…ts is larger than the LBO's share, this is why she prefers asking for money and advice from the LBO fund (see …gure 4).
Figure 4 -The optimal e¤ortsê andâ compared with the optimal e¤ortsẽ andã when the project is highly risky. We consider that d = 60 euros and u = 180 euros. The sign of (ê ê)
The sign of (â â) Figure 5 compares the optimal e¤orts exerted by the entrepreneur and the LBO fund when the latter provides all the needed money, such that i = K W with the e¤orts provided by the entrepreneur and the consultant.
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The sign of (a c â)
We …nd the same results discussed in the previous paragraph.
When the project is lowly risky, the entrepreneur prefers asking for advise from the consultant and for the remaining capital from the bank rather than relying on the LBO fund to advise her and to provide all the money because both agents provide the …rst best e¤orts in the …rst situation.
When the project is highly risky, the levels of e¤orts depend on the impact of the LBO's e¤ort on the performance of the project.
-If the e¤orts have the same impact on the performance of the project, it is optimal to ask separately for advice from a consultant and for money from a bank. Indeed, relying on the LBO fund as a …nancier and an adviser at the same time does not induce them to exert more e¢ cient e¤orts. Dealing with one …nancial investor who o¤ers all the needed tasks is not su¢ cient to induce them to exert more e¢ cient e¤orts. -If is not high enough, without debt, the entrepreneur's e¤ort is more e¢ cient than her e¤ort if the consultant advises her and the bank provides the needed money. However, when her e¤ort does not in ‡uence signi…cantly the probability of success, she provides more e¤ort when the project is implemented with the consultant and the bank. In the opposite, the LBO fund provides more e¢ cient e¤ort than the consultant when it contributes signi…cantly on the probability of success.
Conclusion
This paper has studied the properties of the optimal …nancial contracts in LBO. We have focused on the incentive e¤ects of debt in the presence of a double-sided moral hazard problem. The model explains why the entrepreneur prefers asking for money and for advice from the bank and the LBO fund, despite the fact that the latter can advise her and provide funds.
We show that all agents have to participate …nancially in the project and that the payments of the bank are decreasing with the outcome of the project.
When the project is not very risky, the entrepreneur and the LBO fund exert the …rst best e¤orts and they get equal shares of the outcome of the project. This is no longer true when the acquisition is very risky; the moral hazard problem induces them to provide the second best e¤orts. They must share the revenue in case of success and pledge the entire revenue to the bank when the project fails.
Exploring in full detail how these optimal contracts are implemented in LBO is an important topic for future research. In such research, it would probably be reasonable to study the use of convertible securities in the presence of a passive …nancier as the bank. Another topic for further research is how the cash- ‡ow and control rights are allocated when the pro…tability of the project varies. To our knowledge, research in this direction is still pending.
Moreover, while it is optimal to pledge the entire revenue to the bank in case of failure and to let the entrepreneur and the LBO share the revenue, it may incite them to collude: the entrepreneur and the LBO fund may be tempted to inject money into the project. They aim to mislead the bank: they can tell him that the project has succeeded while it fails. In order to avoid such behavior, Casamatta (2003) assumes that the revenue of the pure …nancier is non-decreasing with the outcome of the project. This makes the question raised in this paper irrelevant since the debt has no incentive impact on e¤orts.
Moreover, in a dynamic model, when the LBO fund has convertible securities, the share of bene…t attributed to the entrepreneur fund may be considered as a signal concerning the quality of the project if there is an asymmetric information on the market. When this share is signi…cantly high, it means that the project is pro…table: the LBO fund cannot exert his conversion option. He will be a minority shareholder and he will look for a quick exit of the project (Signal theory, Leland et Pyle, 1977 and Ross, 1977) .
A. Proof of proposition (1)
Given the participation constraint of the LBO fund and the bank (P C A ) and (P C B ), we can write:
Moreover, K W = i + I, we conclude then that:
We replace H and D in the participation constraints (P C A ) and (P C B ), we get the optimal amounts of equity and debt that must be issued respectively by the LBO fund and the bank:
These optimal solutions exist under the following conditions:
(A3) (respectively (A8)) is satis…ed if (A4) (respectively (A7)) is satis…ed.
On one hand, the conditions (A4) and (A7) imply that:
On the other hand, the conditions (A5) and (A6) give:
but l v(a F B ) = K W > 0 which means that (A10) is always satis…ed. Given that 2l p F B < 2l, (A9) and (A10), we deduce that:
which completes the proof of the proposition (1).
B. Proof of proposition (2)
When the project is very risky, in the sense de…ned in the proposition (2), the collateral H is equal to the liquidation value of the project d .
We replace H = d in the objective function. The optimal …nancial contracts induce the entrepreneur to maximize the social value of the project under the incentive constraints of the two partners: (13) and (14) with the additional constraints:
The Lagrangian is then obtained by:
where i , i = 1, 2 are the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers. Hence the …rst order conditions are given by:
If we suppose that D > 0, the conditions (B3) and (B4) imply that 1 and 2 must satisfy the following conditions:
1=2
It leads to a contradiction of the signs of 1 and 2 . We deduce that D = 0.
The conditions (B1) and (B2) can be written: We replace D = 0 and the e¤orts with their expressions given by (B5) and (B6), we …nd that:
but the condition (B3) implies that:
The conditions (B7) and (B9) are equal only if:
This is true when is the solution to the following equation:
We assume that the revenue of success u is high enough, we get > 0. Hence, (B10) has two solutions:
The sign of these solutions depend on the impact of the LBO fund's e¤ort on the success probability of the project such that:
If > 1 2 , these solutions satisfy 0 <^ < 1 and < 0. If < 1 2 , we have 0 <^ < 1 and > 1.
is the solution to the program of the entrepreneur. Given that^ , optimal e¤orts are given by the conditions (B5) and (B6). To deduce I, we replace in the participation constraint of the bank (P C B ), the amount of equity issued by the LBO fund is given by i = K W I.
C. Proof of proposition (3)
The optimal …nancial contracts are given by the solutions of the following program:
The …rst order condition of V ( ) is given by: If > 1 2 , these solutions satisfy 0 < 1 < 1 and 2 < 0. If < 1 2 , they satisfy 0 < 1 < 1 and 2 > 1.
We conclude that 1 is the optimal share of the bene…t attributed to the entrepreneur.
D. Proof of proposition (4)
First, the participation constraint of the consultant can be written [p(e; a)(
We replace the …rst term of (D1) in the objective function EU E . Hence, the entrepreneur has to maximize the expected social value of the project under the incentive constraints. In addition, the entrepreneur (respectively the consultant) choose the level of e¤ort that enables her (respectively him) to maximize her (respectively his) expected gain.
In the speci…ed model, their reaction functions e(a) and a(e) are given by the …rst order conditions of EU E and EU A . We obtain: Then, we deduce that the optimal levels of e¤orts are given by:
As before, the competition among the consultants and the banks induces the entrepreneur to maximize the surplus of the project in order to determine the optimal …nancial contracts. She must …nd~ ,ẽ,ã,D,H solving (D2) and (D3) with the conditions (6).
If we replace the e¤orts (D2) and (D3) in V (:), the entrepreneur's program is simpli…ed such that:
The …rst order conditions of V (:) are given by: 
Therefore, (D6) gives:
To determine the optimal share rule, we replace (D9) in (D8) so we obtain:
By substituting = 1 2 in both (D8) and (D9), we get:
We …nd a property discussed before in the propositions (1) and (2): the bank's payments are decreasing with the revenues of the project. We notice that the condition (D11) is satis…ed only if the project is not very risky, in the sense u < 2 d .
The participation constraint of the bank (28) and (D11) enable us to deduce the optimal payments of the bank; they are given by:
We …nd that the entrepreneur and the consultant exert …rst order e¤orts when the project is not very risky. This means that there is no di¤erence between an LBO fund and a consultant when the bank accepts to issue the remaining capital.
If the project is very risky 
The condition (D13) enables us to deduce that the di¤erence between the revenues'project is equal to:
If we replace by (D14), we show that the entrepreneur and the LBO fund have to get equal shares such that:
Then we replace = 1 2 in (D15), it is easy to check that D = 2 d u < 0 which is impossible because of our starting hypothesis. So we conclude that D = 0 which completes the proof of the proposition (4).
